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School inspections: can we trust Ofsted reports?
Ofsted inspections of schools have been a central feature of state education in England for
nearly 20 years. Research by If t ikhar Hussain explores the validity of the school ratings
that Ofsted produces, the impact of a fail rating on subsequent pupil performance and the
extent to which teachers can ‘game’ the system.
How to ensure that teachers, doctors and other public sector employees act in the best
interests of  the users of  public services is a challenge f acing governments around the world. Many have
responded by making increased use of  objective perf ormance targets, such as pupil test scores f or
schools and patient waiting times f or hospitals. Empirical evidence suggests that organisations given
incentives to perf orm on such measures of ten ‘game’ the system, subverting the intention behind the
target. For example, schools might try to raise their average test score by excluding lower ability pupils
f rom the test. Or when given a target f or pupils to attain a certain level in key stage tests, teachers might
f ocus on pupils on the margin of  this achievement level, at the expense of  both high and low ability
pupils.
In England, and in the UK more broadly, top-down perf ormance targets have of ten been complemented
by inspection regimes. Examples include the school inspection system run by Of sted (the Of f ice f or
Standards in Education), and the Care Quality Commission f or the healthcare sector. In f act, the UK is
something of  a world leader in the area of  inspections.
The subjective nature of  the perf ormance evaluation undertaken by inspectors holds the promise of
‘measuring what matters’. But inspections may open up a whole new can of  worms. In particular, just like
targets, inspections are top-down and, what’s more, the of f icials who lead them may be prone to biases
and prejudices. Lef t to their own devices to exercise judgement as they see f it, it  is unclear whether
inspectors will act in the best interest of  pupils and parents. Neither pro- nor anti-  inspection arguments
have been backed by hard empirical evidence and this research seeks to remedy this gap.
New evidence on inspection systems
In the absence of  previous empirical evidence – f rom the UK or elsewhere – this study uses the case of
Of sted inspections of  state schools in England to provide some evidence on the ef f ectiveness of  such
subjective perf ormance evaluation systems. The f irst question addressed is whether inspection ratings
provide any extra inf ormation on school quality, over and above what is already available in the public
sphere.
This ‘validity test’ is implemented as f ollows: are inspection ratings correlated with underlying school
quality measures – constructed f rom teenage pupils’ survey reports of  teacher practices as well as
parental satisf action – af ter controlling f or standard observable school characteristics, such as test
score rankings and the proportion of  pupils eligible f or f ree school meals? If  they are, then inspection
ratings have the potential to play an important role in providing inf ormation f or parents considering which
school they would like their children to attend.
The next question addressed is whether pupil test scores improve f ollowing a f ail inspection. This is a
thorny empirical problem because it suf f ers f rom the classic problem of  ‘mean reversion’ – the idea that
a f ailed school’s test perf ormance would have improved (reverted to the mean) even in the absence of  a
f ail inspection. Relatedly, whether schools are able to game the system and artif icially boost
perf ormance f ollowing a f ail inspection is also addressed. The post- f ail incentives to game are strong
and the prior evidence – f rom England and elsewhere – suggests that when teachers are put under
pressure to raise pupil test scores, they may well resort to such strategies.
The nature of Ofsted school inspections
Broadly speaking, Of sted inspections of  schools have three main objectives: f irst, to of f er f eedback and
advice to the head and other teachers; second, to provide inf ormation to parents to aid their decision-
making; and third, to identif y schools that suf f er f rom ‘serious weakness’. Over the period covered by my
research (2005/6 to 2008/9), schools were generally inspected once during an inspection cycle. An
inspection involves an assessment of  a school’s perf ormance on academic and other measured
outcomes, f ollowed by an on-site visit to the school.
For the visit, inspectors arrive at the school at very short notice (no more than a f ew days), which in
theory should enable them to see the school as it ‘really is’ and limit disruptive ‘window dressing’ in
preparation f or the inspections. During the inspection, the inspectors collect qualitative evidence on
perf ormance and practices at the school. This involves classroom observations, in-depth interviews with
the school leadership, examination of  pupils’ work as well as discussions with pupils and parents.
At the end of  this process, the school is given an explicit headline inspection rating – 1 (outstanding), 2
(good), 3 (satisf actory) or 4 (unsatisf actory, also known as a f ail rating) – and the inspection report is
made available to parents and posted on the internet.
Do inspection ratings convey any new information on quality?
Previous research suggests that inspectors’ f indings are reliable, in that two inspectors independently
observing the same lesson will come to very similar judgements about the quality of  classroom teaching.
The issue addressed here is whether inspection ratings are also valid, in the sense of  being correlated
with underlying measures of  school quality not observed by the inspectors. There is almost no empirical
evidence on this question.
I construct a measure of  underlying school quality f rom 14-year-old pupils’ survey responses to
questions about teacher behaviour and practices. These data come f rom the Longitudinal Survey of
Young People in England, a major survey supported by the Department f or Education. The survey asks
six questions on how likely teachers are to: take action when a pupil breaks rules; make pupils work to
their f ull capacity; keep order in class; set homework; check that any homework that is set is done; and
mark pupils’ work. Further analysis using pupils’ reports of  school discipline as well as parents’ reports of
satisf action levels yields very similar results to those reported here f or the teacher practices outcome.
A composite pupil- level score of  teacher practices at the school is computed by taking the average of
the responses to these six questions. The validity test is then undertaken by asking the f ollowing
question: can inspection ratings help distinguish between (or f orecast) schools with good and poor
teacher practices? The crit ical issue is whether inspection ratings summarise inf ormation about
underlying school quality that is not already available in the public sphere. My f indings demonstrate that
on this measure at least, inspectors appear to be doing a reasonable job. Even af ter controlling f or
things like test scores and the socio-economic background of  pupils, inspection ratings appear to have
substantial power in predicting underlying quality.
These results suggest that parents who are looking f or a good school ought to place at least some
weight on inspection ratings. The actual weight will depend in part on how much inf ormation parents
already have about the relevant schools, beyond publicly available inf ormation such as test scores.
The effect of a fail inspection
Turning to the ef f ects of  a f ail rating on a school’s f uture test scores, the data show that pupils’
perf ormance on key stage tests improves f ollowing a f ail inspection. But whether this is a consequence
of  the f ail inspection or simply a bounce back af ter a year or two’s bad luck is a dif f icult question to
answer. To make progress on this issue, I exploit a design f eature of  the English primary schools’ testing
system to solve this mean reversion problem. Key stage 2 tests f or Year 6 (age 11) pupils are
administered in the second week of  May in each year. These tests are marked externally, and results are
released to schools and parents in mid-July.
The window between May and July allows me to address the issue of  mean reversion: schools f ailed in
June are f ailed af ter the test in May but bef ore inspectors know the outcome of  the tests. Thus the May
test outcome f or these schools is not af f ected by the subsequent f ail; neither do inspectors select them
f or f ailure on the basis of  this outcome.
By comparing schools f ailed early in the academic year – September, say – with schools f ailed in June of
the same academic year, I can isolate mean reversion f rom the ef f ect of  the f ail inspection. If  there is any
rebound in test scores independent of  the f ail inspection, we should see it in the schools f ailed in June.
As a check on this approach, a comparison of  observable characteristics prior to the f ail rating f or
schools f ailed in June (the ‘control’ group) and schools f ailed in the early part of  the academic year (the
‘treatment’ group) reveals negligible dif f erences between the two groups.
The results show that a f ail inspection leads to signif icant improvements in test scores. Furthermore, the
largest gains are f or pupils scoring low on the prior (age 7) key stage 1 test. The gains are large
compared with the ef f ects of  other policy interventions that pupils might experience, such as having
higher quality teachers or attending a school with higher attainment levels.
These f indings are consistent with the view that the children of  low-income parents – who are, arguably,
the least vocal in holding teachers to account – benef it the most f rom inspections. Such evidence may
be especially relevant in the current policy environment, where f irst, there is heightened concern about
raising standards f or this group of  children, and second, they are hard to reach using other policy levers.
Evidence on gaming behaviour
Finally, this research also looks into possible strategic behaviour by teachers. I f ind litt le evidence to
suggest that schools f ailed by the inspectors are able to inf late their pupils’ test perf ormance by gaming
the system. First, teachers do not exclude low ability pupils f rom the test- taking pool. Second, although
the evidence on whether teachers target pupils on the margin of  attaining the of f icial prof iciency level
(level 4 on the key stage 2 test) is mixed, I f ind no evidence to suggest that some groups (say, very low
or very high ability pupils) are adversely af f ected by the f ail inspection. Third, although test gains f ade
somewhat over t ime, there is evidence to suggest that f or some pupils, the gains last into the medium
term, even af ter they have lef t the f ailed primary school. This suggests that teachers inculcate real
learning and not just test- taking skills in response to the f ail rating.
These f indings on strategic behaviour are in stark contrast to a signif icant body of  evidence
demonstrating dysf unctional responses to test-based perf ormance evaluation in other settings. My
interpretation of  these results is that by subjecting schools to close scrutiny, inspectors may play an
important role in limiting such distortionary activit ies.
Conclusions
What are the broader lessons f rom this study? The f indings are particularly noteworthy given the
indications f rom past research that subjective assessments may give rise to various biases. For
example, there is evidence to suggest that subjective evaluations of  workers may lead to ‘leniency’ and
‘centrality’ bias in private f irms (Prendergast, 1999). And evidence f rom the public sector points to staf f
indulging their pref erences when allowed to exercise discretion rather than f ollowing f ormal rules
(Heckman et al, 1996).
Although such biases in school inspectors’ behaviour cannot be ruled out, this research demonstrates
that the inspection system appears to be ef f ective along the f ollowing two dimensions: f irst, inspectors
produce ratings that make it easier to distinguish between more and less ef f ective schools; and second,
they are able to identif y poorly perf orming schools, leading to test score gains.
One important f eature of  the English school inspection system is that the key output produced by the
inspectors – an inspection rating and report – is available f or public consumption on the internet.
Consequently, inspectors’ decisions are themselves subject to scrutiny and oversight. One hypothesis
f or f uture research is that this is a key element in driving the posit ive results f ound in this study.
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